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1705 
DEFENDERS OF SMALL BUSINESS?: 
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUPREME COURT’S 
RECENT TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE 
Sharon K. Sandeen† 
In his article The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New 
Millennium, Professor Welkowitz cogently demonstrates that the 
United States Supreme Court has taken a renewed interest in the 
subject of trademark law and apparently is intent on limiting its 
scope.1  This conclusion is, however, only part of the analysis 
required to understand the Court’s recent trademark 
jurisprudence and predict its future development.  As Professor 
Welkowitz suggests throughout his article, the more interesting 
question is this: Why has the Court recently acted to limit the scope 
of trademark law when, during the same period of time, it has 
declined the invitation to impose significant limitations on the 
scope of patent and copyright law?2 
 
         †  Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, St. Paul, 
Minnesota; LL.M., U.C. Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; J.D., University of the 
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., U.C. Berkeley. 
 1. David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New 
Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659 (2004). 
I reached a similar conclusion shortly after the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wal-Mart based on a chance encounter with Associate Justice Anthony 
Kennedy at a luncheon in Sacramento, California.  Since Justice (then Judge) 
Kennedy was one of my law professors, he recognized me and asked me what kind 
of work I was doing.  I told him I was teaching intellectual property law and 
trademark law and that I had recently read Wal-Mart.  His eyes seemed to light up 
and he asked me what I thought of the opinion.  After a brief discussion during 
which I told him I thought the opinion was well-reasoned, I recall being struck by 
the fact that Justice Kennedy seemed to be concerned about the proper scope of 
trademark law.  Because I am a former trademark attorney who had been troubled 
for years about the over-assertion of trademark rights and the under-appreciation 
of common law trademark principles, the thought that the Supreme Court would 
take a greater interest in trademark law was very welcome. 
 2. The case of New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, Inc., 533 U.S. 483 (2001), 
concerned an interpretation of a provision of United States Copyright law that, if 
interpreted in the manner suggested by the New York Times, would have 
narrowed the practical scope of the copyrights enjoyed by freelance authors.  The 
court ruled in favor of the freelance authors.  In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
1
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The four “new millennium” cases reviewed by Professor 
Welkowitz do not contain a direct answer to this question but do 
provide some plausible clues.3  As Professor Welkowitz points out, 
one possible explanation is that the Supreme Court came to the 
rather late realization that lower federal courts had let trademark 
law drift from its historic roots.4  Differences in the constitutional 
bases of the three doctrines may also explain why certain members 
of the Court seem more concerned about the potential 
overbreadth and anticompetitive effects of trademark law than 
about these effects in patent or copyright law.5  A related 
explanation is that the Court is beginning to appreciate the 
important doctrinal differences between the three areas of law.6  As 
Professor Welkowitz explains: “Beginning with Wal-Mart, the Court 
increasingly has viewed trademark law through the lens of unfair 
competition, rather than intellectual property.”7  Unlike patent and 
 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), the Court could have narrowed the 
practical scope of patent law by accepting the limited view of the doctrine of 
equivalents applied by the Federal Circuit, but chose not to do so.  In Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), the Court was asked to rule the Copyright Term 
Extension Act unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated both the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and the “limited times” language of 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.  Instead, it interpreted Congress’ power to regulate 
copyright broadly and upheld the constitutionality of the Act.  Id. at 222. 
 3. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. 529 U.S. 205 (2000); 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Moseley v. V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
 4. Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1660.  See also, Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687, 1688 (1999) 
(describing the state of trademark law immediately prior to the new millennium 
and lamenting the movement of trademark law away from its “traditional 
economic moorings”). 
 5. Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1689 (“Several of the Justices may be 
concerned that Congress is beginning to reach the boundaries of its enumerated 
powers.  Although the Commerce Clause gives Congress broad power to regulate, 
the existence of a specific power to regulate intellectual property [identified by 
Welkowitz as including only patent and copyright law.  See id.], a power that only 
allows rights for “limited times,” and that impliedly contains other limitations, may 
be viewed as an implicit limit on Congress’s power to expand the scope of 
trademark rights.”). 
 6. See id. at 1687-90. 
 7. Id. at 1687-88.  Perhaps inadvertently, Professor Welkowitz enters the fray 
about whether intellectual property is really “property,” by labeling patent and 
copyright law as “the real intellectual property doctrines.”  Id. at 1678-79.  For 
details about the debate whether intellectual property is “property,” see Timothy J. 
Brennan, Copyright, Property and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 675 (1993); 
Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 715 (1993); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
2
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copyright law, which were specifically designed to protect defined 
proprietary interests, trademark law was designed to protect 
consumers and prevent unfair competition.8 
In the remainder of this comment, I explore another possible 
explanation for the Supreme Court’s renewed interest in 
trademark law or, even if it is not, one I hope all courts consider 
when they decide trademark cases: the impact that the improper 
application of trademark law has on small and fledgling businesses.  
If the United States is truly a country that values free competition 
and wants to encourage the development of new businesses—many 
with new and innovative ideas—it must reduce the barriers to entry 
that an expansive view of trademark law erects.  While many 
businesses innovate and create works of authorship and, therefore, 
should be aware of the potential benefits of copyright and patent 
law, all businesses need a name and identity.  Thus, of the three 
intellectual property doctrines (four including trade secret law), 
trademark law is the one that is most likely to immediately and 
directly affect small businesses and fledging entrepreneurs. 
The barriers to entry posed by an expansive view of trademark 
law can take several forms.  Most simply, when trademark law is 
applied too broadly the number of available marks is diminished 
and the transaction costs associated with finding an available mark 
increase.9  For an unsophisticated entrepreneur who proceeds to 
 
715 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); and Lawrence Lessig, The 
Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L. J. 1783 (2002).  See also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:14 (4th ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter MCCARTHY].  In so doing, I believe that he illuminates the need of 
lawyers, courts and many intellectual property scholars to stop focusing so much 
on labels and start looking instead at the underlying purpose of the various 
intellectual property doctrines. 
The problem with the label “intellectual property” is that it inappropriately 
conjures up real and personal property concepts that should not be applied to 
patent, copyright, trademark or trade secret law by rote.  By identifying a dividing 
line between patents and copyrights on the one hand and trademarks on the 
other, albeit while still using the oft-misunderstood “intellectual property” 
moniker, Professor Welkowitz highlights a critical distinction between the 
doctrines.  Patent and copyright law was designed to encourage innovation and 
creativity by protecting the resulting inventions and works of authorship for a 
limited time.  Trademark law, on the other hand, was not designed to protect a 
proprietary right but was designed to prevent unfair competition and protect 
consumers.  Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1678. 
 8. Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1678. 
 9. For a recent account of the consequences of the lack of available names, 
see James Glieck, Get Out of My Namespace, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 21, 2004, at 
3
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open a business unaware of the details of trademark law, the lack of 
available marks engenders a greater risk that he will select a name 
that is already in use by another company and be forced to change 
the name in the early stages of his new business.  Upon receipt of a 
cease-and-desist letter, the fledging entrepreneur will either hire an 
attorney to help resolve the matter or voluntarily change the name 
of his business.  Because many small-business owners harbor the 
view that attorneys are too expensive and tend to identify more 
problems than they solve, the name change option is frequently 
seen as the least costly alternative.  However, even without hiring an 
attorney, recourse to the name change option may entail expensive 
re-signage and printing costs.  It will also entail the loss of whatever 
goodwill the new business owner gained during the initial stages of 
his business.10  Moreover, in order to avoid similar claims of 
trademark infringement by other companies based on the “new” 
name, the business electing to change its name is well-advised to 
incur costs for a trademark search.11 
For a sophisticated entrepreneur who prepares a business plan 
and understands the potential importance of trademark law to the 
future success of his business, the expansive application of 
trademark law means that the costs associated with the selection, 
clearance, and registration of a mark are heightened.  When an 
attorney is hired to assist a business in the selection of a trademark, 
such costs typically include a preliminary search of online databases 
and, if the preliminary search fails to identify a potential conflict, 
may include a detailed search conducted by a professional search 
company.12 Once a search report is obtained, a business is likely to 
spend hundreds of dollars to have the search report analyzed by a 
trademark attorney.  If this analysis reveals that a mark is 
unavailable—a more likely proposition when trademark principles 
are applied broadly—the whole process of selecting a mark and 
 
44. 
 10. In trademark parlance, “goodwill” refers to the source identifying 
function of a mark that, over time, can become stronger and more valuable.  1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 2:15-2:17. 
 11. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
 12. For more information on the trademark selection and clearance process, 
see 1 JAMES E. HAWES & AMANDA V. DWIGHT, TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PRACTICE, 
ch. 2 (2003) [hereinafter HAWES & DWIGHT].  The total cost of both a preliminary 
and professional search can easily exceed $1000 per proposed mark.  Depending 
upon the level of complexity, the scope of the search and the required turn-
around time, the cost of a professional search by a company like Thomson & 
Thomson ranges from $485 to $1920 per mark. 
4
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conducting a trademark search must begin anew. 
When a search report indicates that a mark is available for use, 
most trademark attorneys recommend that their clients file an 
application to register the mark with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.13  A business that hires a trademark attorney to 
assist it to register its marks should expect to spend in excess of 
$1000 per mark for the service.14  If a business elects to register a 
mark without the aid of an attorney, it will spend at least $335 per 
mark, plus the value of the time needed to prepare a trademark 
application.15  If a small business chooses not to register its mark, it 
can still acquire common law trademark rights based upon the 
extent of its actual use of the mark.16  However, the decision to rely 
on common law protection may prove costly to the small-business 
in the long run if such rights are unappreciated by other 
companies that wrongly assert they have superior rights.17  When 
these other companies bring a lawsuit and obtain either a 
capitulation from the small-business owner or an injunction from a 
court, the small business inevitably suffers loss of goodwill and a 
costly name change. 
 
 13. See 1 HAWES & DWIGHT, supra note 12, §§ 1.7-1.10.  The cost to prepare 
and file the application, including the filing fee charged by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, will run anywhere from $500 to multiple thousands 
of dollars depending upon a number of factors, including the number of classes in 
which registration is sought, whether the application is based on use or an intent 
to use, and the nature of the mark. 
 14. This figure is based upon projected costs for a professional trademark 
search of between $300 and $600, the $335 fee currently charged by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (see infra note 15) for filing a trademark 
application for a single trademark class, and anticipated professional fees for 
attorney or paralegal time of at least $350. 
 15. This figure represents the current fee, per class, for filing a trademark 
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  See United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Fees—FY 2004, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2004apr01.htm (last visited 
July 8, 2004). 
 16. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16:1 and HAWES & DWIGHT, supra note 12, 
§ 1.7. 
 17. Pursuant to principles of United States trademark law, the first or “senior” 
user of a mark will prevail over the subsequent or “junior” user of the same or 
similar mark even if the junior user registered its mark first.  2 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 7, §§ 16:4, 16:18.1.  Additionally, pursuant to the principle of concurrent use, 
it is possible for two or more users of the same or similar marks to acquire 
common law rights in such marks and use them concurrently without infringing 
the rights of others provided that such usage is in geographically remote 
territories.  4 MCCARTHY, surpa note 7, § 26:2 (explaining the “Tea Rose-Rectanus 
doctrine” of United States trademark law). 
5
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Given the costs and uncertainty associated with the selection of 
a business name, many small businesses, consciously or 
unconsciously, adopt a strategy of avoidance.  They either proceed 
with their choice of business name under the theory that they will 
deal with any problems that arise at a later date or they will select a 
name that is not inherently distinctive.18  Theoretically, since marks 
that are not inherently distinctive are not protectable unless and 
until they acquire “secondary meaning,” by selecting a “weak mark” 
small-business owners are exposed to less risk of infringing the 
trademark rights of others.19  Additionally, to the extent other 
companies have established secondary meaning with respect to 
their use of such marks, there is arguably more leeway for new 
businesses to use the same or similar marks in conjunction with 
different goods or services.20  Obviously, the strategy of selecting a 
weak mark in order to avoid potential infringement claims is of 
little value if trademark law is applied expansively to provide broad 
protection for such marks. 
While it is tempting to dismiss the foregoing costs as “the costs 
of doing business,” when trademark law is applied too expansively, 
such costs not only go up but they also have a greater impact on 
 
 18. As Justice Scalia explained, “a mark is inherently distinctive if ‘[its] 
intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.’ ”  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000).  In other words, inherent 
distinctiveness is a term of art that focuses attention on the source identifying 
function of a mark.  If a mark immediately conveys that it represents the source of 
goods or services, then it is said to be inherently distinctive.  2 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 7, §§ 11:2-11:4.  If a mark does not immediately convey the source of goods or 
services, then it is not inherently distinctive and cannot be protected without proof 
that it has acquired distinctiveness.  Id. 
 19. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. 
REV. 519, 533 (1993) (explaining the practical significance of weak marks) (“[i]f a 
plaintiff must show that its mark has attained secondary meaning because the 
plaintiff’s mark is weak, an infringing defendant has a much better success on the 
merits.”).  See also Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., 360 F.3d 125, 132 (2d. Cir. 
2004) (denying trademark holder’s motion for preliminary injunction during 
pendency of the suit because the holder’s use of a common last name was 
inherently weak). 
 20. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 11:6 (describing the importance of a 
“strong” mark and, by implication, the inherent problems of “weak” marks) 
(“Being a ‘strong’ mark has significance, in that the mark will then be given an 
expansive scope of judicial protection into different product or geographical 
markets and as to more variations of format.”).  But see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, 
§§ 11:79-11:83 (discussing the strong-weak distinction and noting a difference 
between conceptual strength [based upon placement of a mark on the trademark 
continuum] and market strength [based upon the extent, nature and length of 
use of a mark]). 
6
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small businesses.  This is because the costs to create, select and 
clear proposed marks will constitute a significant proportion of a 
new entrepreneur’s start-up costs.21  In contrast to small businesses, 
large companies often have the marketing and legal personnel 
needed to address the myriad legal issues that trademark law 
presents.  Even where small businesses have the resources to hire 
outside counsel to assist them with their trademark needs, the “gray 
areas” that result from an expansive view of trademark law make it 
much more time-consuming and difficult for legal counsel to 
determine whether a proposed mark can be used without risk of 
infringement.22  In fact, the task is often so uncertain that many 
lawyers will not give formal legal opinions of non-infringement, 
and those who do undoubtedly charge a lot of money for the 
opinion.23 
The Supreme Court’s recent trademark cases present a 
number of factual scenarios where there is a risk that trademark 
law will be misapplied in a way that stifles competition.  In Wal-
Mart, the Court examined the risks associated with the incorrect 
application of the principle of inherent distinctiveness.24  In TrafFix, 
the Court considered the question whether trademarks should be 
recognized for product features that were once protected by patent 
law and the risk that trademark law might be used to protect a 
product feature that has already entered the public domain.25  
While Moseley primarily involved the proper interpretation of the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, more generally it explored the 
 
 21. This point can be easily illustrated with the following hypothetical.  
Suppose a small business has anticipated start-up costs of $10,000.  If it spends 
$1000 for trademark advice and counsel, a full ten percent of its start-up costs are 
dedicated to the selection of a trademark.  A larger company with a start-up 
budget of $1 million, although likely to engage in a more sophisticated trademark 
selection process, is unlikely to budget $100,000 for such purpose.  Even if such 
company expends $10,000 for trademark advice and counsel, such amount is only 
one percent of its start-up budget. 
 22. See 1 HAWES & DWIGHT, supra note 12, § 2.12 (“Evaluating trademark 
searches is an art.  As with so many other areas of law, there are significant 
uncertainties inherent in it.”). 
 23. While I was in private practice I would give advice to clients about how to 
select and protect their trademarks and provide my views on potential 
infringement problems, but I would not give a formal opinion of non-
infringement.  This was due in large part to the American Bar Association 
standards on legal opinions.  My trademark clients, many of them small-business 
owners, were unwilling and unable to pay for the level of due diligence that is 
required before a formal opinion can be rendered. 
 24. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211-13 (2000). 
 25. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30-32 (2001). 
7
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circumstances under which the owners of “famous marks” can 
successfully enjoin the activities of companies that have, admittedly, 
not infringed their marks.26  The Dastar Court was asked to 
determine whether the term “origin” as used in the Lanham Act27 
should be interpreted to mean the original creator of the work or, 
more narrowly, the manufacturer of the underlying good.28 
As noted by Professor Welkowitz, the Supreme Court in each 
of the foregoing cases expressed concern about the anticompetitive 
effects of an expansive interpretation and application of trademark 
law.29  Perhaps the best evidence that the court may want to 
position itself as the defender of small business is the reference in 
Wal-Mart to the “plausible threats of suit against new entrants.”30  
Clearly, the Supreme Court understands that consumers are 
harmed not only by the use of confusingly similar trademarks but 
also by the extension of trademark law in a manner that creates 
greater barriers to competition.  Moreover, Wal-Mart is not just 
about the importance of appropriately limiting the scope of 
trademark law so it does not unduly stifle competition; it is also 
about the consequences of failing to apply a correct conception of 
the law at the right point in time.31  Due to the high costs of 
trademark litigation, post-trial is too late in time for most small 
businesses to establish that no infringement has occurred.  To 
 
 26. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2003). 
 27. The “Lanham Act” is the popular name for the federal law governing 
trademarks.  It was adopted in 1946 and has been subsequently amended on a 
number of occasions.  See Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 
(codified and amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127, 1141 (2000)). 
 28. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
 29. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law, supra note 1, at nn.103, 
113, 135 and 159, and accompanying text. 
 30. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) 
(“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to 
the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule 
of law that facilitates the plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon 
alleged inherent distinctiveness.”). 
Of course, it is ironic to suggest that the Supreme Court has become the defender 
of small-business interests when the defendant in the Wal-Mart case was the largest 
retailer in the United States.  However, the trademark principles that the court 
sets down apply to all users of trademarks, large and small.  Moreover, if the 
subject market in Wal-Mart is defined narrowly as the market for seersucker 
dresses, rather than the market for clothing generally, then Wal-Mart can more 
easily be seen as a “new entrant.” 
 31. Id. at 214 (“Competition is deterred, however, not merely by successful 
suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and the unlikelihood of 
inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged 
inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”). 
8
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address this concern, Justice Scalia suggests the need for more 
bright-line tests.32 
There are several other likely factual scenarios under 
trademark law—not yet examined by the Supreme Court in the 
new millennium—that can stifle the ability of small-business owners 
to compete.  The first is where trademark rights are recognized in 
marks that are not protectable without proof of secondary 
meaning.33  This includes situations where a mark is found to be 
protectable or registerable even though, in the language of the 
Lanham Act, it is “descriptive,” “primarily merely a surname,” or 
“primarily geographic.”34  The second scenario is where the 
geographic or market scope of trademark rights are broadly 
interpreted to include areas that are not obvious from the actual 
use of a mark or from the description of use contained in a 
trademark registration.35  For instance, a company that uses its 
trademark only in Northern California is said to have rights 
throughout California, or a company that uses a mark on bicycles is 
said to have the right to prohibit the use of the same mark on dolls.  
The third set of cases are those in which the plaintiff’s trademark 
rights are applied not only to prevent the use of the identical mark, 
but also to prevent the use of a mark that is found to be “similar.”36 
Entrepreneurs and small-business owners rightly should be 
expected to check their local phone book, the Internet, and the 
trademark database of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office to determine whether another company is already using the 
same mark on its goods and services.  However, they cannot be 
expected to understand and apply the intricate and highly fact-
specific analysis that is required when trademark law is extended 
beyond its obvious contours.37  In other words, while fledging 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a) through (e) (2000) (listing the types of marks 
that cannot be registered) and § 1052 (f) (listing the types of marks that, although 
not immediately registerable, can be registered upon proof of acquired 
distinctiveness (otherwise known as “secondary meaning”)). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(1), (e)(2) and (e)(4) (2000). 
 35. See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, ch. 24 (describing situations where 
infringement is alleged with respect to the use of a mark on related but non-
competitive goods) and ch. 26 (explaining the territorial extent of trademark 
rights.) 
 36. Id., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, ch. 24. 
 37. By “obvious contours” I mean the law of trademark that a small-business 
person of reasonable intelligence, or even an attorney who does not specialize in 
trademark law, might be able to glean from a reading of the actual text of the 
9
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entrepreneurs and small-business owners can be expected to 
understand that their use of “McDonald’s” for a hamburger 
restaurant is not permissible under United States trademark law, it 
is unrealistic to require Mr. McDonald to know that the opening of 
his “McDonald’s Shoe Store” might violate both trademark and 
trademark dilution principles.38 
While the courts in cases that apply trademark law broadly may 
take solace in the fact that they are protecting the plaintiff’s 
“property” or “proprietary rights” every time they interpret and 
apply trademark law in a way that expands the scope of the 
plaintiff’s rights, the courts effectively increase the barriers to entry.  
But it is not just the monetary costs that should concern the courts 
and policy makers.  They should also be concerned that an 
expansive application of trademark law will dampen the 
entrepreneurial spirit by making the process of starting a new 
business, including the seemingly simple task of selecting a name 
and domain name, more difficult.  One need only sit across the 
table from an inventor, an artist, or an entrepreneur and discuss 
their ideas and plans to understand what I mean.  A lot of what 
makes the United States economically strong is the entrepreneurial 
spirit of its people—the drive to work hard, create, and innovate 
and the ability to dream of a new and better future.  For many 
people, that dream is grounded in a desire to start their own 
business. 
By expressing my concerns about the plight of small business 
in selecting a business name, I do not mean to suggest that courts 
should always err on the side of the defendant in trademark cases.  
As noted above, small businesses are also adversely affected by the 
application of trademark law in a manner that does not recognize 
their legitimate common law rights.  Instead, I am suggesting that 
courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office should 
be particularly careful to appropriately define the scope of 
trademark rights in cases where a plaintiff or trademark applicant 
seeks to establish rights beyond the obvious boundaries of 
trademark law.  Specifically, when presented with a mark that is not 
 
Lanham Act, particularly a reading of 15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
 38. It is also unrealistic to expect the small-business person to go through the 
time, trouble, and expense of searching the trademark registration records of 
foreign governments, even though the United States’ adherence to the priority 
rules of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (see Article 
4) suggests that they do so. 
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inherently distinctive, they should be reticent to recognize broad 
trademark rights. 
Congress should also get involved to help rebalance trademark 
law for the benefit of both consumers and small-business owners.  
As it has been suggested elsewhere, Congress can begin by 
repealing the rule of “incontestability” of trademarks or, at the very 
least, by precluding the application of such rule to non-inherently 
distinctive marks.39  It might also consider doing away with the 
principle that allows non-inherently distinctive marks to be 
protected once they acquire secondary meaning.40  In this way, 
businesses would be required to take more care to select truly 
distinctive marks and small businesses that did not wish to incur 
such expense could more safely and easily pursue the strategy of 
avoidance I describe above.  If Congress is unwilling to prohibit the 
registration of non-inherently distinctive marks altogether, it might 
consider doing away with the presumption of validity that attaches 
to the registration of such marks.41  By imposing the initial burden 
of proof on the issue of the existence of a valid trademark on the 
plaintiff, small businesses that are a party to a weak claim of 
trademark infringement may be able to prevail more easily and 
earlier. 
CONCLUSION 
In the quest to encourage innovation and creativity and ensure 
that the industries of the new millennium succeed, it seems that the 
scales of intellectual property law have gotten out of kilter.  The 
United States Congress, courts and many commentators are so 
focused on the “investment” that individuals and companies make 
to develop and market trademarks, to engage in research and 
development, and to produce works of authorship that they seem 
to have forgotten there are other interests to consider.  Most 
importantly, for a society that values free trade and touts the 
benefits of a free market, they have forgotten that intellectual 
 
 39. Port, supra note 19 (arguing that the concept of incontestability that is 
contained in the Lanham Act has altered the traditional scope of trademark 
protection and should be repealed). 
 40. As noted by Thomas McCarthy, the practice of allowing trademark rights 
in non-inherently distinctive marks to be acquired over time upon proof of 
“secondary meaning” is a fairly new feature of United States trademark law.  2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16.34.  If businesses survived without such a rule in the 
past, presumably they can survive without such a rule in the future. 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2000). 
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property is one of the biggest impediments to both.  Moreover, for 
a free market economy that touts the benefits of entrepreneurship 
and laments the failure of small businesses, they appear not to 
recognize that one of the largest constituencies to be adversely 
affected by strong intellectual property rights is small business. 
Given the big names that were involved in the four cases 
before the Supreme Court in the new millennium—Wal-Mart, 
Victoria’s Secret, Twentieth Century Fox—it is easy to forget about the 
small-business person, but I don’t think the United States Supreme 
Court has forgotten.  The concerns that the Court expressed in its 
recent trademark cases, as Professor Welkowitz so succinctly 
describes, may mean that the Court sees a role for itself as a 
defender of consumer and small-business interests.  Since Congress 
has yet to accept such a role, I am glad that someone understands 
that there is more to trademark law than the “property rights” 
banter of large intellectual property rights holders. 
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